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FROM THE AUTHORS
“Especially in German cities there is lots of discussion around new measures to cap rents. Policymakers should be aware of the correlation 
between rental market regulation and home ownership rates. The more regulated the rental market, the more people live in their own homes, 
renters are in a way pushed out of the market.” 
— Konstantin Kholodilin, author —  
AT A GLANCE
Housing market regulation has contributed to the 
worldwide triumph of home ownership
By Konstantin Kholodilin and Sebastian Kohl
• The effects of rental market regulation are often discussed, but mostly in a short-term, 
national framework
• New set of international data allows for long-term analysis of the effects of rental 
market regulations
• Rent control and rationing of housing had a strong effect on home ownership rates in all 
countries examined
• Indirect effects on home ownership should be taken into account when designing rental 
market regulations
• Interests of both tenants and investors must be taken into account
Rental market regulation has an effect on home ownership rates
When rents are capped …
... landlords put up their apartments
for sale because renting them
is not profitable enough any more. 
 ... the rents of unregulated 
housing rise ... 
... households looking for housing
are forced into buying property.
... regulated housing remains 
affordable, renters hang on to their home,
queues build up ...
© DIW Berlin 2019Source: Authors' own depiction. 
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ABSTRACT
The present report presents new historical data based on 
country comparisons and research results regarding rent 
control and its long-term effect on the home ownership rate 
in 27 countries. Policy measures of rent control, protection 
against eviction, and housing space management have been 
widespread in most of the countries studied—particularly in 
continental Europe—in the past 100 years. At the same time, 
the rate of home ownership in those countries has steadily 
risen in the long term. The present analysis shows that in the 
past century, the triumph of home ownership has not only 
been the result of relevant incentive measures and financial 
market liberalization. Indirectly, it is also due to rent control.
The state has good reasons to pursue housing policy. In 
industrialized countries, such policy regulates the rental 
housing market. It does so for two reasons, first, to reduce 
the asymmetry between tenants and owners and second, to 
counteract short-term supply rigidity. If demand for hous-
ing rises suddenly, rent is expected to rise due to housing 
space scarcity. State regulation can moderate the rise and 
meet the responsibility of providing a roof over every head.
Rents have risen in Germany since 2010, which has pivoted 
the spotlight back to the subject of rent control. The pros and 
cons of the price-stabilizing “rent brake” (Mietpreisbremse) 
implemented in Germany in 2015 and other price-regulating 
measures are hotly debated and new models are in develop-
ment. For example, the Berlin Senate is planning to imple-
ment a rent cap that freezes rents for five years.1 More wide-
spread application of the right of first refusal, a rent freeze in 
social conservation areas,2 further tightening of the rent brake, 
restricting real estate purchases for foreigners,3 and expropri-
ation of the housing stock of private real estate companies4 
have been offered as solutions in some regions. Economists 
are wary of regulatory measures (see Box 1), such as inter-
vention in free-market price setting, because they have a rep-
utation for hindering investment in the long term, reducing 
tenant mobility, and raising the difference between rents for 
existing housing stock and new units.
Further, they distort the competition between the purchas-
ing and rental markets that result from the interplay between 
supply (investors, landlords) and demand (tenants). On the 
supply side, the rental market is subject to price restrictions, 
while the home ownership market has remained free. When 
rents are capped (and as a result, landlords’ expected yields), 
it is rational for investors to pull out of the rental housing 
1 Berlin Senate Chancellery, “Senat beschließt Eckpunkte für ein Berliner Mietengesetz/Mietendeckel,” 
press release, June 18, 2019, (in German; available online, accessed June 20, 2019).
2 Ulrich Zawatka-Gerlach, “SPD schlägt fünf Jahre Mietenstopp in Berlin vor,” Der Tagesspiegel, Janu-
ary 22, 2019 (in German; available online, accessed June 17, 2019; this applies to all other online sources in 
this report unless stated otherwise.)
3 Julia Löhr, “Berlin will den Immobilienkauf für Ausländer einschränken,” Frankfurter Allgemeine 
 Zeitung, August 27, 2018 (in German; available online).
4 See the “Deutsche Wohnen enteignen” initiative website (in German); and Lena Klimpel, “Mit Ent-
eignungen gegen Wohnungsnot?” tagesschau.de, April 5, 2019 (in German; available online).
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segment. On the demand side (those seeking a place to live), 
rent stabilization initially makes renting a home more attrac-
tive. Since the supply of regulated apartments is scarce, how-
ever, queues form and the cost of finding an apartment rises 
significantly. Before regulatory intervention, tenant groups 
are highly heterogeneous, including well-to-do tenants and 
those with lower incomes. Tenants with higher incomes have 
a better chance of obtaining regulated apartments because 
from the landlords’ viewpoint, their ability to pay is greater. 
On the other hand, tenants differ when it comes to patience. 
Those who already have an apartment in the relevant city 
have more time to look for a new apartment. Most newcom-
ers urgently need a place to live. This is why they will take 
the ownership route, in which purchase costs are high but 
the costs of finding a home are relatively low. The expan-
sion in the housing supply is also likely to lead to prices fall-
ing in that sector and even more people purchasing their 
own homes. However, it is not clear which effect has more 
weight, regulatory intervention in the price of renting or the 
price- depressing effect of additional housing in the market. 
Indeed, the latter is indirectly due to regulation.
The long-term effects of rent regulation on the housing 
market—on the size of the rental market in particular—
have rarely been discussed. While much research has been 
done on home ownership and subsidized housing, empiri-
cal research on rental markets, in international comparison 
in particular, has been neglected.5
One reason for this is certainly the marked diffusion of home 
ownership in many countries and the political focus on sub-
sidized housing. Even in countries with a low proportion 
of home ownership, such as Germany, the number of ten-
ants has steadily decreased in the long term. Home owner-
ship rates in Europe are very heterogeneous on the regional 
level (see Figure 1). While they are very high in some places 
at the periphery of the continent, significantly fewer house-
holds live in owner-occupied real estate in Central Europe. 
In Germany, 45.5 percent of the population rent their home, 
while in Switzerland the proportion is only 37.4 percent. 
Often, policy makers consider tenant households as “would-
be-owners” and provide them with cheap loans, or they sup-
port them as “former owners.” For example, the state came to 
the rescue in Spain when many home-owners were unable to 
pay back their loans during the 2008–2009 economic crisis.6
Tenants comprise the majority of residents or a significant 
minority in many major cities in the countries studied. The 
way rental agreements are regulated is therefore a key com-
ponent of housing policy.
The reasons for the comparatively low amount of rental mar-
ket research include insufficient and inadequately compa-
rable data. The situation has been considerably improved 
5 Most studies focus on the U.S. and some Scandinavian countries. None of the studies the authors are 
familiar with have an internationally comparative dimension.
6 For example, the regions of Andalusia, Aragon, and Catalonia applied measures to protect households 
that could no longer pay their mortgages against foreclosure.
thanks to new databases (see Box 2). Combining these ena-
bled us to address the question of how rent regulation has 
affected the home ownership rate since it was initially imple-
mented during World War I in western countries, and derive 
some implications for today’s debate.7
A brief history of rent regulation and 
home ownership
Different rent regulation traditions
Based on the data and the rent regulation index derived from 
it (see Box 2), it is possible to outline the past 100 years of the 
history of rent regulation (see Figure 2). In most European 
countries, it began during World War I with strict price 
7 The article summarizes the following current research findings of the authors, published in 
 English: Konstantin Kholodilin et al., “Social Policy or Crowding-out? Tenant Protection in  Comparative 
 Long-run Perspective,” DIW Discussion Paper no. 1778 (2018) (available online). A shorter version 
 appeared as:  Konstantin Kholodilin and Sebastian Kohl, “Verdrängung oder Sozialpolitik? Der Effekt von 
 Mietregulierung auf das Wohneigentum,” Wirtschaftsdienst, Volume 99, 2019, No. 5 (2019): 363–366.
Figure 1
Home ownership rates in Europe







1 NUTS2 regions. The NUTS classification divides the European Union into easily comparable territorial units, see the European 
Commission website for more information.
Source: Eurostat, authors’ own depiction.
© DIW Berlin 2019
At the European periphery many own their homes; in central Europe the home 
owner ship rates are lower.
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controls as an instrument of consumer protection on the 
home front. In the period between the wars, price regulation 
was often retained in a weaker form. It was revived during 
World War II and in continental Europe ultimately became 
the second-generation price controls of the second half of 
the 20th century. They permitted relative rent increases but 
indexed them to various indicators of the general increase 
in the cost of living.
In times of war and directly afterward, the rental housing 
market was the target of profound intervention, often in 
the form of wartime decrees. The measures even went as 
far as forced billeting. Many of the measures were then dis-
mantled, but some—including social conservation areas 
(Milieuschutzgebiete) or restrictions on short-term rental 
(such as Airbnb)—have survived and in recent years, even 
regained some importance. Protection against eviction also 
arose within the context of war and is still a component of 
rental law in some places today. Of course rental agreements 
were legally regulated before the war, but the laws were gen-
erally about renting in general and not specific to housing. 
When they did, they simply contained provisions against 
exorbitant rent increases (usury laws).
Wartime decrees were exceptional measures, but they were 
often incorporated into civil law after the war. These devel-
opments primarily affected countries in central and conti-
nental Europe. In southern and northern European coun-
tries, state intervention was somewhat more extensive than 
it was in countries with a Germanic legal tradition.
Box 1
Policy tools for housing market regulation
Housing policy is defined as the measures the state uses to influ-
ence the situation in the housing market. State interventions in the 
rental market often have the goal of supplying people with afford-
able, quality living space. This often serves a country’s higher-level 
goals, including political, social, and economic stability.
The state has a wide range of tools to accomplish this goal. They 
can be divided into supportive or restrictive instruments. There are 
two kinds of supportive measures: property support (support for 
(subsidized) housing construction) and personal support (support 
for households in the form of a housing allowance). The restrictive 
instruments work on three levels: rent control, protection against 
eviction, and housing space management.
Rent control. The main goal of rent control is to protect tenants 
against speculative or excessive rent increases. When housing 
space is scarce, as a rule rents begin to rise—either due to the 
rate of new construction being too low in relation to the population 
increase, a decline in the housing stock due to war or natural ca-
tastrophe, or there is surplus demand in the rental housing market. 
In the short term, it is virtually impossible to adjust housing supply 
to demand. Given this situation, price regulation was originally es-
tablished as a short-term solution. Later, it turned into a permanent 
intervention in market mechanisms.
Modern rent controls were initiated during World War I. Back then, 
the “first generation” of rent regulation was implemented. It is 
also the tightest form of such regulation and can be described as 
freezing rent prices. This type of rent control was often rolled back 
in the years after the war but experienced a widespread revival 
during World War II.
Protection against eviction. This policy’s purpose is to reduce the 
risk of eviction for tenants. Popular instruments are laws on min-
imum terms for rental contracts or minimum legal requirements 
for termination of such contracts. The legal specification of pre- 
defined reasons for eviction such as personal need, delays in rent 
payment, or disturbing the peace in the building plays a key role. 
Tenant protection has a special role in housing market regulation, 
since it closely corresponds to rent regulation. For example, cer-
tain types of tenant protection in combination with special price 
regulations—such as the legal minimum term for rental contracts 
when rents for the existing housing stock are regulated but rents 
for new apartments are not—can make rents rise to a significantly 
greater level than they would in an unregulated market.1
Before World War I, eviction law was extremely liberal everywhere 
in the world. Upon contract expiration, landlords could evict ten-
ants without much effort. In the course of the 20th century, in many 
countries the legal situation changed to the advantage of tenants, 
who to this day benefit from robust protection against eviction. At 
the same time, regulation intensity has fluctuated over the past 
100 years as it did in the case of rent control.
Housing rationing. The goal of this policy is to conserve scarce 
housing space. It is applied to both the supply and demand sides. 
On the supply side, measures designed to avoid the loss of apart-
ments to the rental market are implemented. For example, rental 
units are often prohibited from being demolished, misappropriated, 
combined, or converted into condominiums. On the demand side, 
maximum standards for living space per person can be specified, 
or freedom of movement can be restricted by limiting the number 
of people who can move to areas with a strained rental market.
Some measures can be classified as housing policy by extension, 
including construction standards, urban planning, environmental 
protection, fiscal policy, and bank regulation. These measures can 
all affect the incentives in the residential real estate market.
1 Jan Philipp Weber, “The Regulation of Private Tenancies – A Multi-Country Analysis,” dissertation at 
Universität Regensburg (2017).
349DIW Weekly Report 38/2019
HOUSING MARKET REGULATION
That tradition of detailed regulation can be contrasted to the 
more liberal Anglo-Saxon way of doing things. In countries 
such as the U.S., for example, rents were also regulated dur-
ing times of war or other crises (for example, during the oil 
crisis of the 1970s), but that remained an exception. After 
the war or when the inflation shock had ebbed, the regula-
tions were gradually dismantled. A national rent policy did 
not emerge in the U.S. afterward, and therefore the rele-
vant regulations of the country’s cities have markedly dif-
ferent histories and levels of intensity.8 Those countries did 
not develop strong tenant protection systems, and housing 
rental was often considered only a temporary residual form 
of housing with a social stigma attached.
Varying prevalence of home ownership
Since World War I, the home ownership rate in Western 
countries has risen constantly, and it is converging at a high 
level (see Figure 3). South European countries and some in 
northern Europe have developed into strongholds of home 
ownership: Norway has a rate of 77.5 percent, for example. 
The rates there are even higher than those of the Anglo-
Saxon countries, where home ownership was historically 
more firmly established. The German-speaking countries 
continue to lag behind (see Figure 1).
8 Since World War II, the city of New York has had a rent regulation system in which first generation 
(rent control) and second generation (rent stabilization) regulatory elements both exist at the same time. 
See Timothy Collins, An introduction to the New York City rent guidelines board and the rent stabilization 
system (2016) (available online, accessed August 23, 2019). In California, on the other hand, the Costa- 
Hawkins Act has restricted municipal implementation of rent control systems since 1995.
Rent regulation has reduced the number of 
rental units
Home ownership has triumphed for many reasons: the gen-
erally higher level of prosperity, the ageing of society, an 
expansion in the housing stock, the spread of condomini-
ums, steadily falling real interest rates, and in many coun-
tries, policy measures that support home ownership.
Multivariate time series analyses confirm these traditional 
explanations (see Box 3 and Table). For example, the depend-
ency ratio of non-working age persons to the working age 
population has a positive influence on the increase in home 
ownership, whereas the long-term interest rate has a nega-
tive one. Surprisingly, the per capita GDP also has a nega-
tive influence, which might support the theory that in poorer 
countries, home ownership functions as insurance against 
negative economic trends.9
The analysis also shows that in the long term, tighter hous-
ing space management and rent price controls correlate 
with a rise in the home ownership rate. Protection against 
eviction, on the contrary, was found to be insignificant. The 
influence of rent control is not linear. Once rent control has 
reached a certain level (an index value of 0.79 or higher), 
tighter price controls do not correlate with a continued rise 
in the home ownership rate.
9 As an additional control variable, the purchase price-to-rent ratio has the expected negative sign 
( relatively higher purchase prices make home ownership less attractive), but the coefficient is not 
 statistically significant. This is why the variable was not used in the present analysis.
Figure 2
Rental regulation intensity1 by legal origin
1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020




















1 See definition in Box 2.
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
© DIW Berlin 2019
Countries with a German legal tradition used to have strict rent control mechanisms, which have been softened over the past three decades. 
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Box 2
New data on home ownership and rent regulation
The new rent regulation data1 include: regulation indexes on 
rent, tenant protection, housing space regulation, and the rate of 
ownership in 27 countries since World War I. They are: Australia, 
Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, India, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Canada, Luxembourg, Morocco, New Zealand, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Singapore, Spain, South Africa, the UK, and the U.S. The data are 
based on a collection of all relevant historical rental laws in each 
country and the coded content of 18 binary categories: for exam-
ple, if there is a real or nominal price freeze, if tenants have eviction 
protection, or if building demolition is prohibited. These categories 
were aggregated to create regulation indexes for the areas of 
1 The data set is still growing but has already been published. See Konstantin Kholodilin, Jan Philipp 
Weber, and Steffen Sebastian, “Rental Market Regulation over the Last 100 Years in an International Com-
parison,” DIW Weekly Report, no. 45 (2018): 453–464 (available online), and https://www.remain-data.org/.
rent control, protection against eviction, and housing space man-
agement, plus a global index.2 The higher the index value, which 
was standardized to values between 0 and 1, the tighter the rental 
market regulation.
The table shows the definition of the data, its sources, and some 
descriptive statistics (minimum, average value, maximum, and 
standard deviation). The panel is not balanced since the number of 
decades per country varies from two for Greece (from 2000–2010) 
to 11 for the U.S. (1910–2010). On average, the data cover five dec-
ades per country.
2 For more detailed information, see Konstantin Kholodilin, “Measuring Stick-Style Housing Policies: 
a Multi-Country Longitudinal Database of Governmental Regulation,” DIW Discussion Papers, no. 1727 
(2018) (available online); and Jan Philipp Weber, “The Regulation of Private Tenancies – A Multi-Country 
 Analysis,” dissertation at Universität Regensburg (2017).
Table
Data description
Description Source Period Minimum Mean Maximum
Standard 
deviation
Home ownership rate defined as a share of owner occupied 
dwellings in total housing stock, in percent
Kohl (2017)1, Compendium of Housing Statis-
tics of the UN, national statistical offices 
1910–2018 19.950 59.149 96.175 16.230
Rent laws index, [0,1] Own calculations 1910–2017 0.000 0.429 1.000 0.372
Square of rent laws index, [0,1] Own calculations 1910–2018 0.000 0.338 1.000 0.354
First-generation rent control index, [0,1] Own calculations 1910–2018 0.000 0.439 1.000 0.466
Second-generation rent control index, [0,1] Own calculations 1910–2018 0.000 0.068 1.000 0.241
Tenure security index, [0,1] Own calculations 1910–2018 0.000 0.317 1.000 0.251
Housing rationing index, [0,1] Own calculations 1910–2018 0.000 0.092 0.875 0.163
Rental market regulation index, [0,1] Own calculations 1910–2018 0.000 0.373 0.833 0.285
Condominium dummy (1, if condominium law is active) Own calculations 1910–2018 0.000 0.425 1.000 0.482
Real GDP per capita, 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars Maddison Project Database 1910–2016 0.521 11.050 77.638 12.320
Ratio of dependent (younger than 15 and older than 64 y.o.) 
population to working-age (15 through 64 y.o.) population, [0,1] 
World Development Indicators of the World 
Bank and European University Institute 
1899–2016 0.255 0.614 1.113 0.157
Housing completions by 1000 inhabitants Kohl (2018)2 1860–2010 0.251 5.437 15.203 2.765
Long-term interest rate, in percent Macrohistory database, OECD 1870–2017 0.670 6.175 87.376 6.132
1 Sebastian Kohl, “Homeownership, Renting and Society: Historical and Comparative Perspectives” London: Routledge (2017).
2 Sebastian Kohl, “Too much mortgage debt? The effect of financialization on new construction and residential capital investment,” unpublished manuscript (2018).
© DIW Berlin 2019
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The effect of rent control on the home ownership rate may 
be due to two factors. First, the landlords of regulated apart-
ments can no longer rent them profitably and subsequently 
offer them up for sale.10 Second, there are also non-regulated 
apartments and their rents rise faster than they would in 
the absence of regulation.11 The market is obviously divided 
into two segments. The first is a regulated market with very 
low rents and tenant households that do not want or are not 
able to give up their apartments because they would not be 
able to rent under such good conditions anywhere else; the 
second is a free market with very high rents. In many coun-
tries with a similar market structure, for example Sweden 
or the United Kingdom, many people are forced to become 
home owners because they cannot find affordable apart-
ments to rent.
Other factors may have played a role in the spread of home 
ownership, such as direct support for home ownership and 
financial market liberalization. For the period starting in 
1970, these factors can be measured in two indexes. On the 
one hand, for several decades experts from OECD countries 
have been asked how effective they think the measures in 
support of home ownership are. This index is indeed able to 
provide a partial explanation of the increase in the home own-
ership rate.12 On the other hand, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) summarized the degree of financial market lib-
eralization in many areas (the development of securitization 
markets, for example) and in many countries into a finan-
cial reform index.13
Adding these two indexes to the estimate does not change 
the main finding that rent control has a positive influence 
on the home ownership rate.
The findings point in a direction similar to the one indicated 
by anecdotal evidence and American studies:14 profound 
intervention in rent prices or the housing stock causes land-
lords to sell their rental units to tenants. When income is 
rising, more and more tenants can afford to purchase their 
homes. In the context of rising housing scarcity—exactly 
the circumstances under which rent control is applied most 
intensively—many have no choice other than to purchase 
their homes.15 With the spread of alternative investment 
opportunities such as stocks, flight from the rental market 
becomes a real option.
10 A similar effect is expected for Berlin as a result of the planned rent cap. See Ralf Schönball, “Sieben 
Thesen zum geplanten Mietendeckel,” Der Tagesspiegel, June 17, 2019, (in German; available online).
11 See Konstantin Kholodilin, Andreas Mense, and Claus Michelsen, “Mietpreisbremse ist besser als 
ihr Ruf, aber nicht die Lösung des Wohnungsmarktproblems,” DIW Wochenbericht, no. 7 (2018): 107–117 
(available online).
12 Mikael Atterhög, “The Effect of Government Policies on Home Ownership Rates: An International 
 Survey and Analysis,” in Home Ownership: Getting in, Getting from, Getting out. eds. John Doling and Marja 
Elsinga (Amsterdam: Delft University Press, 2006), 7–34.
13 Abdul Abiad, Enrica Detragiache, and Thierry Tressel, “A New Database of Financial Reforms,” 
IMF Working Paper 8/266 (2008) (available online).
14 Daniel K. Fetter, “The Home Front: Rent Control and the Rapid Wartime Increase in Home Ownership,” 
NBER Working Paper, 19604 (2013) (available online) studied the rise in the home ownership rate in the 
U.S. in the wake of price controls during and after World War II.
15 Fetter, The Home Front.
Conclusion: rent control has long-term effect on 
home ownership and policy measures must take 
this into account
Housing market regulation is a social policy instrument with 
a long history. It is used worldwide on a regular basis. It bal-
ances out the interests of landlords and tenants and takes 
into account that homes are an economic good with many 
special features. Supply is inflexible in the short term, and 
waves of strong demand trigger very strong price reactions. 
This can cause households to spend larger and larger pro-
portions of their income on rent16 and get pushed out of the 
rental market, eroding social structures and causing parts 
of the population to lose access to the regular housing mar-
ket. Such trends can be observed in many German cities, and 
the pressure on policy makers to counter the development is 
growing. On the other hand, real estate is an investment good 
whose appeal is determined to a great extent by its flexibility 
of use and the opportunity to generate profits. There is obvi-
ously a long-term relationship between the supply of rental 
housing and the intensity of regulatory intervention, just as 
16 See Christian Dustmann, Bernd Fitzenberger, and Markus Zimmermann, “Housing expenditures and 
income inequality”, ZEW Discussion Paper, No. 18-048 (2018) (available online, accessed September 2, 2019).
Figure 3
Worldwide home ownership








1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Sources: Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), United Nation Statistics Division (UNSD), national 
statistics offices, authors’ own depiction.
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Up to the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 the home ownership rate rose steadily, 
since then it has been stagnating or even declining. 
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the demand for rental housing is likely to be determined by 
regulation: higher levels of tenant protection increase the 
appeal of renting in the short term.
The present report shows that the intensity of the regulation 
leads to a different balance in the stock of rental units and 
condominiums in the long term. Part of the globally observed 
difference among home ownership rates can be explained 
by differences in regulatory intensity. The evidence based on 
micro data also supports this relationship.17
This must be considered when planning further interven-
tion in the housing market, as currently under discussion 
in many German cities—Berlin in particular. The more pro-
found the market intervention, the greater the long-term 
negative effect on the supply of rental units. When design-
ing new regulatory measures for the rental market, the bal-
ance between the interests of tenants and those of investors 
must be preserved.
17 Rebecca Diamond, Timothy James McQuade, and Franklin Qian, “The effects of rent control 
 expansion on tenants, landlords, and inequality: Evidence from San Francisco,” American Economic 
 Review 109 (9) (2019): 3365–3394.
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Table
Influence of selected factors on the home ownership rate
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Rent control in previous decade 10.08*** 21.86*
 (2.88) (9.09)
Rent control (squared) in previous decade −12.20
 (8.93)
First-generation1 rent control in previous decade 3.30
 (1.83)
Seond-generation rent control in previous decade −0.56
 (2.80)
Protection against eviction in previous decade 2.46 3.80 0.81
 (3.61) (4.57) (3.79)
Housing space management in previous decade 6.46 7.73 6.90 3.72
 (8.47) (8.52) (8.90) (8.66)
Aggregated regulation in previous decade 14.29**
 (4.62)
Dependence ratio 24.66 23.21 21.15 19.80
 (13.64) (13.76) (14.59) (14.03)
GDP per capita −12.51* −10.96* −12.76* −12.19*
 (4.79) (4.75) (5.05) (4.77)
Housing completions per 1,000 inhabitants 5.93** 5.55** 5.25** 6.29***
 (1.74) (1.75) (1.82) (1.75)
Interest rate 0.622* 0.661** 0.686** 0.674**
 (0.328) (0.331) (0.343) (0.329)
Possibilty of buying single units² −1.282 −0.913 −1.452 −1.476
(2.240) (2.252) (2.348) (2.233)
R2 0.29 0.27 0.23 0.31
Adj. R2 −0.08 −0.10 −0.18 −0.07
Observations 130 130 130 130
1 See Box 1. 
2 Refers to the first-time introduction of the possibility to buy single apartments. According laws were passed in the 1950s and 
1960s. Prior to that, it was usually possible to buy entire apartment buildings only.
Reading example: the first figure (10.08) means that any increase of 0.1 in the rent control intensity corresponds to a one-percent 
increase of the home ownership rate.
Significance levels: * p<0,10, ** p<0,05, *** p<0,01.
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
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Box 3
Estimation methods
Since the existing data have two dimensions (time and coun-
tries), the estimates were based on panel data models. The 
model was formulated like this:
yit = β
'xit + γ
'ri,t−1 + μi + δt + vit
in which yit stands for the change in home ownership rate 
(WEQ) of country i in decade t in comparison to the previous 
decade; xit is a vector of the control variables; rit is the vector 
of the rent regulation index (here the data are taken with a 
time delay of one decade here to avoid possible endogeneity); 
μi are country-specific fixed effects, δt are decade-specific 
fixed effects, and vit is the error term. Home ownership rates 
were differentiated to correct for possible autocorrelation. The 
estimates were carried out with country-decades as cases, 
since home ownership rates are surveyed relatively infre-
quently and the annual time series would have too many gaps.
LEGAL AND EDITORIAL DETAILS
DIW Berlin — Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung e. V.
Mohrenstraße 58, 10117 Berlin
www.diw.de
Phone: +49 30 897 89 – 0 Fax: – 200
Volume 9 September 18, 2019
Publishers
Prof. Dr. Pio Baake; Prof. Dr. Tomaso Duso; Prof. Marcel Fratzscher, Ph.D.; 
Prof. Dr. Peter Haan; Prof. Dr. Claudia Kemfert; Prof. Dr. Alexander S. Kritikos; 
Prof. Dr. Alexander Kriwoluzky; Prof. Dr. Stefan Liebig; Prof. Dr. Lukas Menkhoff; 
Dr. Claus Michelsen; Prof. Karsten Neuhoff, Ph.D.; Prof. Dr. Jürgen Schupp; 
Prof. Dr. C. Katharina Spieß; Dr. Katharina Wrohlich
Editors-in-chief
Dr. Gritje Hartmann; Mathilde Richter; Dr. Wolf-Peter Schill
Reviewer
Dr. Alexandra Fedorets, Dr. Claus Michelsen
Editorial staff
Dr. Franziska Bremus; Rebecca Buhner; Claudia Cohnen-Beck;  
Dr. Daniel Kemptner; Sebastian Kollmann; Bastian Tittor;  
Dr. Alexander Zerrahn
Sale and distribution
DIW Berlin Leserservice, Postfach 74, 77649 Offenburg
leserservice@diw.de
Phone: +49 1806 14 00 50 25 (20 cents per phone call)
Layout
Roman Wilhelm, DIW Berlin
Cover design
© imageBROKER / Steffen Diemer
Composition
Satz-Rechen-Zentrum Hartmann + Heenemann GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin
ISSN 2568-7697
Reprint and further distribution—including excerpts—with complete 
reference and consignment of a specimen copy to DIW Berlin’s 
Customer Service (kundenservice@diw.de) only.
Subscribe to our DIW and/or Weekly Report Newsletter at  
www.diw.de/newsletter_en
